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The Gray Legion: Information Warfare Within Our Gates
Abstract
The information environment, once viewed as an unassailed common for human
knowledge, has revealed itself to be a vector for malicious narratives in the ongoing battle
for global hegemony. Since 2014, the United States has been under siege from information
attacks on multiple fronts, from cyber infrastructure and goods to the cognitive outlooks of
its citizenry. Disinformation as a social media tool represents a novel and grave danger to
democracy; it serves as a means for sowing unrest and influencing policy changes while
enabling conventional conflict or—in the best case for those who would exploit and
manipulate narratives—avoiding it entirely. In this article, we identify the harbinger of a
dire threat that circles outside, and now inside, the United States' walls by exploring the
theoretical dynamics of foreign, state-sponsored disinformation in democracies throughout
the West. We examine the mechanisms through which this approach operates and why it is
Russia’s preferred course of action.
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Introduction
Nearly two centuries before the World Wide Web emerged, a prominent
Prussian military theorist interpreted warfare as the summation of will
and means as elements of competition between belligerents.1 In the time
prior to General Clausewitz’s observation and in the conflicts that
followed, the determination of the onset of hostilities would involve an
engagement with or meaningful attack on an adversary’s will and means,
such as the assassination of a royal figure or the sinking of a ship.
Although kinetic approaches more straightforwardly define the onset of
hostilities, soft acts may just as easily signal state-level conflict,
particularly through an ever-increasing range of information-based
methods. It is for this reason that the question of opening salvoes in the
next war may have already been answered.
Foreign, state sponsored disinformation has co-opted commons created to
facilitate free communication and engagement. Whether focused on the
internet or the preponderance of the tech industry which manages major
social media platforms, the West finds its creations (Facebook, Twitter,
Reddit) now being used to attack its own vital decision-making processes.2
The targets of these attacks are leaders and citizens, with the former
uniquely dependent upon the latter in representative democracy. The
proliferation of technology and means of access allow millions to receive
and send messages, while the effective anonymity of online involvement
cloaks nefarious actors. The masterminds behind these online personas
seek to avoid conventional confrontation, and the modern internet
landscape provides them a vector to better their geopolitical position
without provoking a dire military situation; their fake accounts represent a
facet of their asymmetric approach.
By refusing to meaningfully acknowledge and address disinformation and
social media manipulation (or even the attempted manipulation thereof to
deceptively affect democracies), the United States fools itself into believing
that hostilities are on the verge of initiation when they, in the minds of the
adversaries, are a matter of ongoing operations. Even without ongoing
interference, the population’s perception of journalism and scientific
analysis has eroded in recent years, an environment which may be
amenable to disinformation due to favorable audience predispositions to
already accepted narratives or ongoing degradation of faith in democratic
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institutions.3 The Rubicon has long been crossed; the legion has already
marched to the foot of Rome’s hills.4
A growing trove of expert analysis suggests a dark side to the information
age, one that threatens objective truth, collective understanding, and
legitimate democratic functions.5 The effects of these new disinformation
tactics suggest a critical failure in traditional news media’s screening
procedures, a new source of virulent narratives spread via social media,
and the ultimate subversion of dialogue among subgroups in the
information space. Phenomena such as echo chambers, vox populi media
reporting, and two-step communication flow result in multiple vectors and
venues used to seed the information landscape; these tactics—though their
content originates with foreign, deceptive online personas—exploit the
organic, U.S. audience in propagating disinformation, an act made easier
through social media mechanics.6
The fallout from the infamous Russian-based Internet Research Agency
(IRA) case is not entirely unique; organizations and networks like the IRA
multiply each day and their tactics advance at a pace limited only by fiberoptic cables. Multiple datasets and newly identified disinformation
networks, as well as accompanying warnings, emerge routinely from social
media corporations, security think tanks, and government agencies; many
of these highlight focused efforts against democratic nations, including the
United States.7 The legion that democracies and governments now face is
one of murky narratives, questionably sourced half-truths, and cleverly
managed online personas managed by foreign firms. In previous articles
about this topic, many scholars eschew provocative language in favor of
more neutral discourse; this is a form of euphemism or understatement in
which the authors of this article will not partake given the gravity of the
situation.8
This nation and its allies have been under insidious assault for years, from
Russian online influence in U.S. elections to military activities observed in
Georgia and Crimea. The United States is beginning to see such actions in
a more serious light, but such response does not address the false
perception that all is well on the information front.9 If warfare is an attack
on the will or means to conduct the basic functions of statecraft, then an
attempt to covertly subvert (especially deceptively) another nation’s
decision-making ability (democracy, public sentiment) is as nefarious an
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action as a blockade or skirmish. However, this approach, though
unsettling, should be unsurprising: in the standard Diplomacy,
Information, Military, and Economy (DIME) model for state power,
information is the only meaningful field of competition for the West’s
rivals.10 In Russia’s case, its leaders either desire further prestige and
power in a perceived zero-sum situation or believe that the West
represents an existential threat through the neo-liberal system; both
perceptions make conflict (short of provoking outright martial
engagement) a required course of action in a battle of diplomatic and
economic attrition with accompanying military protection.11
The answers to the following questions support the assertion that soft war
is upon the United States: What is happening (with a focus on Russia)?
Why is it important? What can be done to stop it? This article will
illustrate that these gray zone operations are existential threats which are
uniquely situated to erode Western sovereignty with a focus on how will
and capability manifest in a democracy facing disinformation. It is the
authors’ hope that readers will find themselves mobilized to further
analyze, communicate, and address this threat in effective ways so that
they may more meaningfully counteract foreign, state-sponsored
disinformation. Members of the citizenry must no longer allow hubris or
embrace ignorance; “peace for our time” usually comes at great cost—one
that the Melian dialogue suggests many would find uncomfortable.12

Background
In the past decade, experts have witnessed the rise of soft warfare
(influence) facilitated through cyberspace and social media.13 Until the
hearings and indictments regarding Russian interference in the 2016
election, the United States had not openly discussed such behavior; at the
time of this writing, many could make the argument that the nation is only
beginning to address it. Soft power in and of itself can be a crippling sword
in the battle between states, but the United States has normally enjoyed
the benefits of its favor rather than seeing that weapon turned upon itself.
With the resurgence of Russia, the United States finds new tests in the
arena of soft power. The West, with all its military might, is likely to
succeed in any local military endeavors and many expeditionary ones. To
varying degrees, the United States has also been quite successful in the
economic and diplomatic realms. Foolishly, however, it has ceded the
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information arena to those with malicious intent.14 Some may argue, with
degrees of validity, against this assertion. However, one need only consider
the vitriol of the 2020 presidential election, marked by narratives
promoted by past IRA actors, and carried by multiple incensed groups. As
a vector for social media virulence, this marks a Western response that
falls far short of what many would call success.
The citizens of the United States live in a democratic republic that—as with
other western nations—enjoys voting processes and general freedom of
information and expression. Ultimately, elected officials (ostensibly) make
decisions based on the choices of the voting populace, whether that be
retribution or support at the ballot box or apathy at the same. In a diffuse
and delayed fashion, one can sway democratic states merely by influencing
the citizenry—or its officials—to vote (or not vote, as the case may be) in a
specific way favorable to a foreign entity, as is feared with
contemporaneous hacking threats and their accompanying social influence
efforts.15 These approaches circumvent arenas in which the United States
and the West have cultivated national strength: Military and economic,
both levers which are subject to leadership’s analysis and decisions, unlike
activity in the information space. In a military sense, there is a clear
delineation between Clausewitzian will and means: The means—tanks,
boats, planes, bombs, treasure—are either too powerful or too impractical
to engage. The will—how much Americans wish to employ state means
manifested by the electorate through its leaders—is not.
As a nation, the United States has for many years dabbled or specialized in
expeditionary deployment and conflict. The projection of its armed forces
has become so ubiquitous—the constant state of war another element of
the 21st century military milieu—that politicians continuously campaign
on platforms (or modify agendas) of “bringing the troops home.”16 Many
Americans lack the will to continue hostilities or engage in new ones, and
both the media and politicians frame and react to that stance. Gray zone
operations rely on public and government will or the lack thereof; by
pushing the threshold of intervention just short of requisite retaliation, an
adversary can steadily make small gains. At the state-level, shorter
offensive advancements make for a slow but sure strategy against an
opponent determined to prevent more powerful (and provocative)
maneuvers. Given the pervasive nature of information, a well-planned
campaign can also affect diplomatic outcomes, either increasing costs to
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maintain newly strained relationships between allies or forcing leadership
to continuously convince their electorate of the need for such global
institutions. Paired with stoking internal conflict, this practice stalls
immediate confrontation heuristics while poisoning long term national
outlooks via the voting populace.
To expand upon Clausewitz and situate the effects of influence efforts on
democratic nations, one can look to sociologist Charles Tilly who identified
that states must engage in certain activities as a form of homeostasis—war
making, production, extraction, adjudication, state making, distribution,
and protection. Of these forms, extraction is the most complex in
democratic forms of government: “drawing from [the nation’s] subject
population the means of state making, war making, and protection” in the
exact dynamic addressed with the matter of will and means.17 If the state
cannot extract from its people the will to ensure internal order (state
making), exert force upon external rivals (war making), or check rivals to
state power internally and externally (protection, analogous to
counterterrorism), then the state may as well be defenseless throughout, if
not entirely defunct.
To this point, attacking the extraction function results in the inability to
decisively act against threats or the mistaken perception that allied
individuals and organizations are threats themselves.18 This trend appears
across current disinformation in social media; it relies on hostile action
which falls below a commonly acceptable threshold for egregious hostility
and, thus, chips away at the ability to see it for what it is without spurring
due response. Without addressing such activity meaningfully, the result is
a silent war that the West will have lost the moment its citizens deny the
existence of Odysseus and his men inside the Trojan horse; social media
provides the perfect cover for the legion’s entrance into the discourse, as
well as its perceived legitimacy as a beneficent, honest participant.

Russian Actions
The 2016 elections illustrated that the United States is not disconnected
from the realities of its European allies. Ongoing disinformation issues—
more advanced than the ones the United States encountered in past
years—show that this antagonistic behavior is still useful to the Russian
disinformation export apparatus. In addition to fanning the flames of
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political and social turmoil, what should be most concerning is Russia’s
employment of hybrid warfare. The invasion of Georgia in 2008 saw an
initial, expansive Russian cyber-attack to disrupt Georgian internal,
internet-based communication methods (including media) paired with a
propaganda campaign to inundate audience members with fabricated
information.19 The result of this information barrage was a softened target
unable to resist physical engagement due to internal confusion and
dissuasion. A similar play from the Russian team in 2014 manifested in
Crimea: Facing increasing unrest over the Maidan protests and their
puppet Ukrainian President, Russia began to sow disinformation online
that tapped into specific narratives of conflicting Ukrainian ideological
subgroups.20
Over the past six years, foreign sources stoked U.S. societal ills and
conducted cyber-espionage to seed domestic media with information
supporting or amplifying cultural anxieties, such as race, immigration, and
crime.21 The manipulative online personas and their activities oftentimes
appeared so legitimate that they were retweeted by elected officials,
featured in U.S. media, and followed by its people. The coordination
between multiple organizations to conduct such harmonious activities
suggests an intentional, highly prioritized effort to degrade U.S. decisionmaking abilities and standing.22 Experts continue to observe IRA-affiliated
network creation, with one discovery occurring as recently as July 2021;
this activity is ongoing.23
The effects do not have to be specific or even have a definite end goal.
Clausewitz’ concept of will is generally linked to certain behaviors (the
waging of war), but it is much more abstract in this sense. It is the will to
do anything of consequence outside of political infighting that is conducive
to successful external and international influence; the more society focuses
inwardly on elections, riots, or questioning legitimate societal institutions,
the less attention and consideration its members grant to the bear
trampling through the European woods. This is the beginning, at a macro
level via micro means, of the degradation of the United States’ ability to
resist Russian influence. Members of society become dissuaded from
action because they are convinced—either through the electorate or
through the leaders who pride themselves on more limited military
involvement—that the problem is not worth prioritization, compared to
the more pressing conflicts within the borders or discord with allies. This
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plays perfectly into the desired, countervailing global power structure
Russia seeks to cultivate; where they create a vacuum of Western
leadership via distraction and dissuasion, they give themselves room to
grow.24
In a scenario where disinformation actors completely delude their
audiences, the problem itself, to the misled, is nonexistent—a seemingly
likely possibility given the authors’ discussions with acquaintances as to
whether Russian social media bots engaged domestic audiences between
2014 and 2018. The cost incurred by U.S. adversaries in taking these
opening shots? Minimal, except for the time to weaken psychological
foundations and principles—a resource which is inconsequential outside of
a four-to-eight-year election priority cycle, an irrelevant constraint in
Russian politics and strategy.
In line with the increasingly complex and frequent attacks on collective
democratic decision-making, Russian military theorists’ foreshadowed the
same tactics and strategy. Russian military journals define their unique
form of information-psychological conflict thusly:
The main aim … is regime change in the adversary country
(through destroying the organs of government); by means of
mass influence on the military-political leadership of the
adversary achieving as a minimum an increase in the amount
of time available for taking command decisions and
lengthening the operational cycle; by means of influence on
the mass consciousness of the population—directing people
so that the population of the victim country is induced to
support the aggressor, acting against its own interests.25
Within the idea of gray zone conflict, Russian efforts have evolved (or
returned) to embrace (coyly, if not always publicly) the clear intent to
destabilize other nations’ governments without ethical caveat. In previous
years, nations would see targeted political influence in the information
realm primarily as an affront to the notion of Pax Democratica and the
ongoing pacifying march of Liberalism (both neo and classical). However,
the data indicate neither restraint nor sole focus on specific geopolitical
outcomes. The IRA’s tweets and posts seek to cause chaos instrumentally:
To turn citizen against citizen by attacking issues of race, religion, and
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rule. They focus on internal U.S. wedge issues while trying to insincerely
guide conversations toward foreign policy. They aim not only for discrete
outcomes in the international field of competition, but, rather, shoot to (on
an informational, narrative level) kill. Their target: The dialogue that
makes democracy possible and enables the destabilization of Western
governments.

Synthesis
The United States and the West have generally viewed war as a
continuation of politics but has failed to consider the inverse mechanics:
Politics as a continuation of war. This inversion not only allows for the
perpetuation of myths regarding peace through increased tension, but it
supports foes who understand the extreme cost of full, expeditionary
conventional military operations. It allows military and national buildup
that remains below the level of outright conflict (and the technical
declaration of war) but still results in the loss of both tangible and
intangible national capital for the target. If the end goal is destruction of
an enemy, arms are not the only means; just as adversaries view
nonmilitary means as hostile (sanctions, diplomacy), so too should
Americans view asymmetric efforts against the United States and its
citizenry as directed attacks.26
Adversaries recognize they need not separate military goals from national
strategic goals. The former is not an end unto itself; it is a means to the
latter. Through whole-of-government efforts and multi-domain
operations, online influence becomes a chief tool for countless adversary
objectives. This assessment is not idle conjecture, but the Russian
military’s stated strategy. It is a playbook they used in Crimea and
Ukraine:
In the 21st century we have seen the tendency toward
blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars
are no longer declared … The role of non-military means of
achieving political and strategic goals has grown. … the
broad use of political, economic, informational,
humanitarian, and other non-military measures—applied in
coordination with the protest potential of the population [is
the new focus of conflict]. All this is supplemented by
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military means of a concealed character, including carrying
out actions of informational conflict and the actions of
special operations forces. The open use of forces—often
under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation—is
resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the
achievement of final success in the conflict.27
And one that they have used against other nations in the West:
Of great importance here is the use of the global internet
network to exert a massive, dedicated impact on the
consciousness of the citizens of states that are the targets of
aggression. Information resources have become one of the
most effective types of weapon. Their extensive employment
enables the situation in a country to be destabilized from
within in a matter of days… In this manner, indirect and
asymmetric actions and methods of conducting hybrid wars
enable the opposing side to be deprived of its actual
sovereignty without the state’s territory being seized.28
In this model of required state functions, adversaries avoid the
diplomatically and financially expensive war making and protection
aspects of government (the military M of the DIME model) and rather
attack the extraction via assumedly innocuous methods such as social
media. These nations enjoy operating in the gray area before the United
States would escalate to conflict, effectively employing soft methods
against U.S. decision-making (extraction) apparatuses and all while
furthering their national standing in both territory and prestige. Rather
than influence and interference for the sake of simple, standard statecraft,
these information efforts occur in concert with expansion and
questionable state motives including the first invasion in Europe since
World War II.29
Near-peer adversaries are stalling and distracting to delay military
response; should the trend continue, they will likely force the West to a
level where military confrontation is either ill-advised or untenable. These
opening shots have been occurring in plain view as pundits, politicians,
and military professionals—and the people writ-large—debate their
existence, meaning, and interrelation in meaningful but ultimately
45
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frivolous models, given the inaction that has thus far resulted. The first
shots were fired years ago. The question of whether the United States
chooses to truly acknowledge and act upon them remains.

Conclusion
In democracy, the institution of the electoral process and the choice of the
people must be sacred. U.S. and western stakeholders must recognize,
duly and totally, the attacks upon this central decision-making aspect:
“Beliefs are not idle because the decisions we make on their basis have real
consequences. If you believe false things about the world, and you make
decisions based on those beliefs, then those decisions are unlikely to yield
the outcomes you desire.”30 This notion that adversaries have altered
beliefs to enable strategic and operational military expansion and action—
coupled with the attempt to modify beliefs across the West—should be the
harbinger of a dire threat that circles outside, and now inside, our walls.
There are many suggestions as to the proper response to these attacks
ranging from disrupting the flow of information to informing the
citizenry.31 However, even when disinformation is labeled as false, many
citizens and decision-makers chose to believe what they see, not
necessarily the disclaimers that accompany memes and information.32
Short of stalling the spread of information (a difficult task), a holistic effort
would be most effective—one that is informed by national-level
apparatuses and enabled through partnership with private organizations.
A purely governmental approach is inadequate; bureaucracy moves too
slowly to defeat the disinformation, requiring additional stakeholders and
partnerships.33
The military cannot influence the domestic information space, but it, along
with national-level intelligence organizations, can identify foreign
behavior and sources.34 Armed with this information, social media, and
traditional media companies—who have already made great strides since
2016—must be convinced to associate propaganda sources with overt
knowledge of the source. Readers’ exposure to knowledge of a source’s
foreign or insidious origin may temper emotional response to the
information.35 Although it is difficult—due to the speed and dynamics of
the online information ecosystem—to aggregate and display the most
recent and relevant misinformation and disinformation, a figurative
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“smoking kills” equivalent on sources like RT could eventually saturate the
information environment in a positive direction.36
Many platforms have already begun to implement a labeling approach to
counter mis- and disinformation; this effort must continue, increase in
scope, and leverage whole-of-government coordination to aid in
identification and analysis of larger networks and changing tactics—
allowing collective awareness among all friendly stakeholders. There is
also a question of how to address existing disinformation that resides
among legitimate domestic audiences as well as its recirculation via social
media mechanics; this topic is beyond the scope of this study but
represents the enduring threat that externally sourced disinformation can
pose once narratives gain purchase in the West’s collective
consciousness.37
If pervasive symbols become persuasive, calling actual fake news by its
name, repeatedly, could stick in citizens’ minds. This inoculation, paired
with real-time, widespread deceptive persona identification and deletion,
would attack both deceitful online personas and their ersatz news media
payloads.38 While watching and learning about an adversary who clearly
has some new tricks to teach, domestic and allied stakeholders can begin
to make things right: Addressing this threat, as a nation, and giving it due
attention.
Unfortunately, the new baseline for interstate conflict has been set: the
information realm has almost limitless potential for disruption,
disinformation, and narrative manipulation. The legion has rallied, and
the stakes made known. The free flow of ideas, Western democracy’s civic
bulwark, has become a wall both subverted and co-opted by actors veiled
with plausible deniability. This possibility, the notion that adversaries can
use information against a system which theoretically benefits from its free
flow, is neither novel nor nuanced; scholars and experts continue to raise
the alarm to no avail.39 Interestingly enough, the klaxons have been
sounding for many years; in 1995, Colonel Richard Szafranski, with near
prescience, claimed:
The United States should expect that its information systems
are vulnerable to attack. It should further expect that attacks,
when they come, may come in advance of any formal
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declaration of hostile intent by an adversary state. When they
come, the attacks will be prosecuted against both knowledge
systems and belief systems [via technological means], aimed
at influencing leadership choices. The knowledge and beliefs
of leaders will be attacked both directly and indirectly.
Noncombatants, those upon whom leaders depend for
support and action, will be targets. This is what we have to
look forward to in 2020 or sooner.40
The year 2020 has given way to a new decade and a new era in which the
reality of democratic vulnerabilities has been laid bare. The fields of
friendly strife have been warped, converted into battlefields by those who
would see benefit from divide et impera.41 Regarding those who seek to
turn citizen against citizen, perhaps it is time the West views the
interlopers as information environment invaders rather than embracing a
grand and intoxicating ignorance granted by nearly a century of
dominance. Alea iacta est. The die has been cast. It is how we face the
legions now at and within our gates that will determine the Republic’s fate.
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Here the authors reference a now commonly understood phenomena within groups of
three or more. This concept was first explored sociologically at a micro, individual level;
here, it references larger groups which, when reduced to common units of analysis
(large groups interacting in a collective sense) allows it to maintain validity: Georg
Simmel, “The Dyad and the Triad,” Classical Sociological Theory, eds. Craig Calhoun et
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